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Critics of Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policy during the 1930's 
are familiar to students of United States domestic and foreign politics; 
in newspapers, periodicals, on radio and on the floor of Congress, the 
critics' vociferous opposition to the actions and inactions of the admin-
istration won them a place in American history. In general, historians 
have tended to label most of these critics as "isolationists"; more recently, 
they have been viewed in the larger context of pacifism and an American 
peace movement.1 
I think that there were ideas and attitudes in much of the criticism 
of Roosevelt's policy that were essentially neither isolationist nor pacifist 
in character,2 and that these ideas and attitudes comprise an important 
strain of American thought that has been overlooked and distorted by 
mislabeling. Many were common not only to pacifists and isolationists 
but also to more conventional liberal and conservative thinkers; I clas-
sify their common theme as "anti-imperialist."3 
American isolationism was primarily concerned with the nation's loss 
of unilateralism. The significant forces pulling the nation toward war 
were seen as external to the United States, and isolationist spokesmen 
often were afflicted with robust nationalism and sometimes with racism. 
The isolationist spokesmen of the thirties tended to be more concerned 
with Europe than with the Pacific, where war with Japan was considered 
less dangerous than one in Europe.4 Pacifists were, by definition, op-
posed to involvement in any war. 
In contrast, the anti-imperialism of the 1930's focused upon American 
policy, rather than that of other nations, as the force propelling the 
country toward war. Both moralistic and pragmatic, anti-imperialist 
thinking was critical of American motives, methods and goals; it was not 
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opposed to internationalism per se. Anti-imperialists were primarily 
concerned with the impending conflict between the United States and 
Japan rather than with European affairs, although the latter were not 
ignored. Although some anti-imperialist spokesmen were also pacifists, 
many were not. 
I am going to assume that anti-imperialist ideas are significantly 
different from those of isolationism and pacifism where they have been 
carelessly grouped. I will try to isolate the anti-imperialist strain of 
thought, to examine its content and viewpoint and to identify its spokes-
men; and finally to consider the failure of anti-imperialism to influence 
the mainstream of American thinking, as well as its place in the Ameri-
can tradition. 
By and large, most of the books, magazine articles and speeches that 
exemplified the anti-imperialism of the thirties were produced between 
the summer of 1937 and the spring of 1938. There was earlier anti-
imperialist literature in 1934 and 1935, but the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese war in 1937, the strenuous efforts by peace groups to pressure 
the administration to apply the neutrality laws to that war, the Panay 
crisis in December 1937 and government proposals for extensive naval 
building combined to produce a period of peak activity. After 1938, 
anti-war, anti-imperialist agitation diminished steadily in the face of 
growing public hostility to Japan and increasing newspaper and political 
support for administration policy. Like isolationism, it abated rapidly. 
By 1940, the Tripartite Pact linked Japan and Nazi Germany tightly 
together in American minds, and the anti-imperialist movement was all 
but dead. Here and there an isolated voice questioned American policy, 
but it made no echoes and received no answers.5 "The American mind," 
wrote historian Tyler Dennett at that time, "is now nearly if not quite 
closed to argument on behalf of Japan."6 
Anti-inrperialist spokesmen in the thirties were not organized in any 
way nor were their efforts coordinated. Politically and economically, 
they were a heterogeneous group; yet on the subject of American rela-
tions with Japan, they held a common set of ideas. They believed that 
United States policy under Roosevelt was leading the nation toward war. 
They did not believe that war with Japan was inevitable nor did they 
view such a war as potentially advantageous for the United States. They 
called not for isolation, but for an end to a particular kind of involve-
ment in East Asia which, in their view, was bringing the country to the 
edge of conflict, although their differences prevented any agreement on 
precisely what policies should be taken to avoid war. 
A fundamental assumption among administration critics was that 
economic motives were the foundation of the country's policy in the 
Pacific. The Open Door, the traditional American policy toward China, 
was regarded as nothing more than a means of upholding the rights of 
American business in China, and present policy was seen as likely to 
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"turn out to be little more than the old imperialism with a new name."7 
More specifically, the anti-imperialists assumed that Roosevelt was com-
mitted to the protection and extension of American business interests in 
East Asia and was willing to risk war in order to do so. Conservative 
critics of the President, such as Nicholas Roosevelt, an ex-governor of 
the Philippines, who felt forced to confess that American interests in the 
Pacific were selfish were reinforced by less restrained critics such as U.S. 
Representative Robert G. Allen of Pennsylvania who proposed that the 
United States was arming to make the Orient "safe for the Standard Oil 
Company."8 
Roosevelt's requests for a large and growing navy and his refusal to 
withdraw American troops from China (the 13th Regiment was sta-
tioned at Tientsin and American gunboats regularly patrolled the 
Yangtze River) were viewed as dangerously provocative. In hearings 
held by House and Senate Committees on Naval Affairs on proposed 
naval appropriations in the spring of 1938, administration naval policy 
was repeatedly described as offensive in intent and effect, rather than 
defensive. And behind this policy, it was said, lay the determination to 
protect and advance private investments and trade interests abroad. "We 
must not fight," stated the Ohio Valley Labor News, "to save the invest-
ments of corporations which hold immense concessions in China, pro-
tected at the present time, by American gunboats."9 As early as 1935, 
and again at the time of the legislative hearings, the editors of The 
Nation expressed fear that United States naval strategy against Japan 
appeared offensive, not defensive. Commenting on the absence of appro-
priations for coastal defense, the editors questioned the true intent of the 
White House appropriation bills.10 
Anti-imperialist critics called for clarification and exposure of Amer-
ican policy in the Far East. They believed the public was generally 
unaware of the provocative nature of the country's foreign policy and 
portrayed a nation tricked into war for the benefit of the few who had 
investments and commercial interests in East Asia.11 "They are educat-
ing you [the American people] for war," warned Senator Rush D. Holt 
on a national radio network, ". . . shall your brother be shot to protect 
the oil business in China?"12 Similarly, in protesting the use of Amer-
ican troops and ships to protect business interests in China, the Execu-
tive Committee of the National Council of Methodist Youth accused the 
president of whipping up public sentiment against Japan. "If you lead 
us into war in the Far East," the council warned, "we will not support 
your Administration in that war. It will not be our war, we cannot 
fight in it."13 
Much emphasis was given to the argument that private U.S. invest-
ments and commercial interests in the Pacific were not large enough to 
justify a costly war. From this point of view, the President was not 
only leading the country toward war but also toward a war with rela-
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tively low stakes. Again and again, spokesmen of different persuasions 
cited the disparity between the returns and benefits from American eco-
nomic activity in Asia and the high cost in money and lives of Roose-
velt's policy of protecting these interests. The total value of United 
States investments in China was equated with the cost of four new 
battleships and was shown to total less than the increase proposed in the 
controversial naval legislation before the Congress.14 A study by the 
Institute of Pacific Relations in 1936 revealed that American trade with 
the Far East was relatively small, totalling some $837 million, that most 
of it was with Japan, and that, in the balance, the United States im-
ported more than it exported to East Asia. American investments in the 
Far East, adding up to some $750 million, comprised between 5 and 6 
percent of the nation's total foreign investment. Tallying up the annual 
costs of the Departments of State, Commerce and Agriculture concerned 
with the Far East, author Miriam S. Farley concluded that the country 
spent at least $339,570,000 in the Far East to protect an annual profit of 
$128,000,000. If the naval costs of protecting trade were included, 
Farley noted, the United States spent seven times what it received from 
business activities in the Far East.15 In more dramatic terms, news-
papermen Boake Carter and Thomas Healy revealed that the total direct 
American investment in the Far East was the equivalent of one half the 
amount spent in the country for cigarettes in 1937 and one sixth the 
amount spent for liquor. Adding to direct American investments in the 
Far East the amount of indirect investments, such as banks and mission-
ary property, Carter and Healy reached a total of $750 million, one-
seventh of American investments in Latin America. In China specifi-
cally, American investment was one-twentieth the total liquor outlay of 
the country, a direct investment of $132 million. Turning to trade, 
Carter and Healy echoed Farley, pointing out that Japan was the coun-
try's third best customer in the world while China was the fifteenth.16 
The panic caused by the Panay incident in December 1937 when 
Japanese planes bombed and sunk a marked U.S. gunboat in a daylight 
attack on the Yangtze River intensified criticism of Roosevelt's policy of 
protecting these relatively small investments. Even before the episode 
focused attention on the fact that American naval gunboats regularly 
patrolled the Yangtze River and protected Standard Oil ships in Chinese 
waters, Standard Oil had been singled out as one of the major investors 
in the Far East, holding perhaps one third the total American invest-
ment in East Asia. Also cited as major investors were the Electric Bond 
and Share Co., the National City Bank of New York, Pan American Air-
ways, International Telephone and Telegraph, and Socony Vacuum Oil 
Co.17 After the Panay sinking and the waves of emotion that flooded the 
country following the episode, anti-imperialists bemoaned the dangers 
inherent in Roosevelt's China policy.18 
64 
Having proposed that the President was moving the country toward 
war in order to protect private economic interests and having shown that 
those interests were small and not very profitable to the country at large, 
critics attempted to explain the apparent folly of the administration's 
willingness to risk war over such small stakes. To some, it seemed that 
Roosevelt was preparing to fight not only for the protection of the small 
American investment (some $750 million) but also for the immense 
interests of Great Britain (estimated at approximately $4 billion).19 This 
was one more example, noted the anti-imperialists, in which the Ameri-
can people were being misled about the nature of the country's Far 
Eastern policy.20 Isolationists too, when they turned to the Pacific, saw 
the United States being tricked into conflict with Japan for the protec-
tion of British interests, but they paid little attention to the role of 
American imperialism.21 
In addition to arguing that American economic interests in the Far 
East did not justify a war, anti-imperialists also proposed that such a 
war was unnecessary, that the United States could ignore what Japan 
did in East Asia, and that Japanese control of China, Manchuria and 
even the Philippines, would not be harmful to the interests of the United 
States. The Sino-Japanese conflict did not in itself threaten world 
peace.22 Japanese control of East Asia would deprive the United States 
of only one raw material, and that was tin, which could be stockpiled. 
The American stake in the Far East did not justify even a fifth class war, 
argued Healy in front of the Senate naval committee. "Not the slightest 
evidence has been brought forth to prove that Japanese control of all or 
part of China will be a real menace to the lives or property of Americans 
that are in China." American sales in Manchuria had actually increased, 
rather than decreased, since Japanese control was extended over the 
area.23 
Representative Henry Lucky showed members of the House Naval 
Affairs Committee a letter from Theodore Roosevelt to William Howard 
Taft in which the ex-President wrote that the United States could keep 
Japan out of Manchuria and Korea only by war and that American 
interests there were not really important enough to warrant such a war. 
At the present, anti-imperialists argued, Japan was more of a threat to 
Soviet interests in northern China than to American. Repeatedly, they 
pointed out the anti-Japanese position of the Communist Party in the 
United States and its call for a boycott against Japan, which confirmed 
their contention that Japan threatened Russia in the Far East.24 
Few anti-imperialists were as extreme as isolationist Ralph Townsend 
who proposed that Japanese intervention in China was a positive bless-
ing for the Chinese who wanted only the "privilege of working, eating, 
gossiping, and dying in peace," which the Japanese could guarantee to 
them but which the Chinese were unable to get for themselves.25 How-
ever, many critics argued that Japan was only following in the footsteps 
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of the Western powers in China. They proposed that Japan had legiti-
mate grievances to justify her aggressions in north China, which were in 
the tradition of Western imperialism. "This country [the United States] 
is no country to be telling Japan to get out of China, until our invest-
ments and imperialistic interests there have been removed," declared 
the representative of the National Council of Methodist Youth to the 
House Naval Committee.26 Over and over, the Roosevelt policy was de-
cried as one of selfish imperialism whereby the United States, along with 
Britain, France and Russia, attempted to hold onto its large share of 
the world's resources and wealth, and to prevent the "have nots" of the 
world, Japan and Germany, from sharing in them. Frederick J. Libby, 
a Quaker pacifist and executive secretary of the National Council for the 
Prevention of War, pointed out that the peace-loving nations of the 
world had four-fifths of its resources and were, therefore, peace-loving. 
Those who wanted to change the situation were, Libby said, labeled 
"aggressive." Only when the world's resources were equally divided, he 
predicted, would there be peace.27 Retired Major General Smedley D. 
Butler, who described his career as "running around the world guarding 
Standard Oil tins . . . ," presented members of the Senate Committee on 
Naval Affairs with a personal confession and condemnation: "I have 
been on fourteen expeditions robbing little Central and South American 
countries in the interests of Wall Street and their bankers."2S United 
States action in Vera Cruz, commented Maine Republican Congressman 
Ralph O. Brewster, was comparable to that of the Japanese in China.29 
The United States "has no more right to run South America than 
Japan has to rape China," said Benjamin Marsh.30 
Speaking in a more pragmatic vein, Tyler Dennett proposed that war 
between the United States and Japan would accomplish nothing except 
to leave the United States "holding a bag." China, he predicted, would 
bring troubles: unless the United States was prepared to keep troops 
there, communism would sweep over Asia. The fruits of war would be 
rotten ones.31 Similarly, Norman Thomas, Socialist Party leader, offered 
a pragmatic argument: if Japan defeated China, he predicted, she 
would be bogged down in guerrilla war and resistance; if the United 
States defeated Japan, we would have to remain in China, would have 
to become a militarized nation, and would become a fascist state at home 
and the arch-imperialist of the world.32 
Numerous and various critics offered warnings that the U.S. was 
heading for a war that was unnecessary and unwise. To many of them, 
who saw danger and folly in Roosevelt's policy, the solution seemed 
apparent, and between 1934 and 1938 most anti-imperialists called for 
withdrawal from the Far East and renunciation of the self-imposed com-
mitment to defend China and the Philippines. Bruce Bliven, New 
Republic editor, expressed the most common sentiments of the anti-
imperialists. "We could buy out our entire interest in the Orient, in-
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eluding Japan, China and the Philippines, for less than what this coun-
try spends every year on barbers, hairdressers, and manicurists."33 Pull 
out, buy out, and give up the capitalist dream of profit from the develop-
ment of East Asia, was the popular solution. For the socialists, such a 
pullout was intricately tied with radical change in the economic system. 
For the pacifists, it was necessary to avoid war. For more traditional 
thinkers in the anti-imperialist camp, withdrawal was a problem, a 
chimerical goal, and they generally settled for less. The Nation, for 
example, deploring the goals of the United States in East Asia, argued 
for collective security, a cooperative Anglo-American effort to maintain 
the status quo without the use of force or threat of force. Withdrawal, 
the magazine maintained, would only strengthen Japan.34 
Surveying the sources of anti-imperialist attitudes and ideas during 
this period, we see that the ranks included persons of disparate ideo-
logical commitment: although pacifists and socialists predominated, per-
sons of liberal and conservative bent, basically content with the existing 
economic and political system of the country, Democrats and Republi-
cans, internationalists as well as nationalists, contributed to the anti-
imperialist theme during these uncertain years. Among the most vocal 
and persistent were the pacifists. 
As Charles Chatfield points out in his recent study of American paci-
fism from 1914 to 1941, pacifists had a long tradition of opposition to 
economic imperialism, speaking out against government policy in the 
Philippines and in Latin America in the 1920's. Throughout the twen-
ties, the pacifist journal World Tomorrow decried the imperialist com-
petition between the United States and Japan and expressed fear of its 
coming to a violent conclusion.35 Similarly, in the thirties a large and 
influential segment of American pacifists went beyond opposition to 
conflict with Japan on moral grounds. They attempted to analyze the 
world situation, the policies of the administration, and to seek the causes 
of the war they feared was evolving. In World Tomorrow and Peace 
Action, in regular news releases, radio broadcasts and in appearances 
before Congressional committees and public meetings, they not only 
brought their moral views before the country, but often expressed an 
anti-imperialist interpretation of events. 
Frederick Libby, for example, was an indefatigable spokesman. Per-
sistently, he used the forum of Madison Square Garden or a Congres-
sional hearing room to condemn war as unethical and to bring his anti-
imperialist analysis of current events to the public. Also prominent was 
Kirby Page, counted in both pacifist and socialist ranks, who went be-
yond his fervent belief that "war is an utter denial of the spirit and 
example of Jesus" to analyze the world situation. The threatening war 
was, he proposed, the result of capitalist competition, and Japan, Ger-
many and Italy, deprived of their share of the resources of the world by 
the U.S., Britain and France, would fight to get their way.36 
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Bruce Bliven was both pacifist and socialist in his views. Assuming 
that imperialism was an inevitable product of capitalism, the socialists 
had no doubt that American policy was imperialistic. Frequently, they 
pointed to the lack of idealism in American foreign policy and added to 
the weight of anti-imperialist thinking in the country. But the Socialist 
Party was not in the forefront of the anti-imperialist movement for sev-
eral reasons. At this time, the party was torn by serious factional strife; 
individual socialists were also in conflict as their pacifist tendencies met 
head-on with their opposition to fascism. Norman Thomas was more 
concerned with Europe than with Asia and became a major opponent 
of collective security and aid to the Allies. In addition, the socialists be-
lieved that peace would be secured not through changing the foreign 
policies of nations but only after popular efforts had brought about a 
new social and international order. Change of existing societies was 
their principal goal. 
The sources of anti-imperialist ideas include many persons and or-
ganizations that do not fit neatly into categories such as pacifist and 
socialist. Men such as Walter Van Kirk, Methodist leader and active 
peace worker; Clark Eichelberger, director of the League of Nations 
Association; Philip Jessup, professor of international law at Columbia 
University; Thomas H. Healy, Dean of the School of Foreign Service at 
Georgetown University; historian Charles A. Beard and journalists such 
as Boake Carter and Nathaniel Peffer can be labeled as liberal thinkers. 
Similarly, church groups such as the National Council of Methodist 
Youth, the Executive Committee of the Mennonite Peace Society, the 
Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Episcopal Church; lay 
organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and the League 
of Women Voters; and publications such as the Nation, the New Repub-
lic and Asia, were sources of anti-imperialist ideas. These liberals, them-
selves a highly heterogeneous group, and the pacifists noted above com-
prise the largest number of anti-imperialist spokesmen, although others, 
such as Representative Hamilton Fish and Nicholas Roosevelt, should 
not be overlooked. 
No single anti-imperialist statement is better known than the words 
of Charles A. Beard to the House Naval Affairs Committee in which he 
declared: "From long travel and study in the Orient, I have come to 
the conclusion and I will say it here as emphatically as I can, that the 
whole of the Orient from Siberia to Singapore is not worth the bones of 
one American doughboy today. Stay out of it."37 Closely tied to the 
populist reform tradition of the early part of the century and to the 
socialist tradition, Beard was a prolific critic of administration policies 
during the thirties. He is not, however, one of the most frequent sources 
of anti-imperialist writing. WThen considering American foreign policy, 
he emphasized that it would lead to international involvement that 
would distract the nation from urgent domestic reforms. "If there is 
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anything in American traditions and practices to guide us, it is that a 
wider spread of economic calamity will culminate in a foreign war, 
rather than in a drastic reorganization of domestic economy/'38 Beard's 
fear that war would prevent reform was not unusual. Benjamin Marsh, 
for example, speaking for the People's Lobby, said that measures to 
abate the Depression had failed and that war in Europe and the Far East 
was being used to distract the people from this failure.39 Libby and 
other spokesmen for the National Council for the Prevention of War 
reiterated this idea, as did Thomas and other socialists.40 
Beard's chief concern was the domestic scene, and he consistently re-
lated international events to the internal situation. Indeed, he saw the 
very origins of modern American imperialism, the imperialism of Ma-
han, Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge and Beveridge, in a concerted effort to 
divert the country from the "specter of Bryanism."41 According to 
Beard, the very validity claimed for imperialism—surplus production 
and the need for markets—was rooted in the failure of the economic 
system to give its own members sufficient purchasing power. If the 
American economy were reorganized and purchasing power were in-
creased, the nation would be free from surplus and from the fear of 
surplus production; it would no longer be necessary to seek overseas 
markets and concessions or to sell abroad.42 
Thus, Beard believed that Franklin Roosevelt was moving toward 
intervention and toward cooperation with Britain and France to divert 
the nation from its troubles. He also recognized diverse and selfish pres-
sures on the president: those of the munitions and naval supply manu-
facturers, the cotton growers, the railroads, the banks, and the exporters 
and importers who hoped to profit from American involvement.43 He 
insisted that America's problems would not be solved overseas. Foreign 
trade and foreign affairs affected the economy only minimally. Espous-
ing a version of economic isolationism that he called continentalism, 
Beard proposed that foreign trade was generally dangerous, that it pro-
voked rivalries and trouble, and that the nation should import only 
what was necessary to maintain its standard of living.44 "Nothing we 
can do for Asiatics," he argued, "will materially increase our trade or 
add to our, or their, well being."45 Only on occasion did Beard turn his 
attention to the nature of contemporary American power and criticize 
the development of a navy for the protection of "acquisitive private in-
terests."46 No gain would come from international greatness, he warned, 
and cautioned against the United States following in the dangerous 
paths of the Roman and British empires.47 
The best example of the liberal viewpoint can be found in Nathaniel 
Peffer's writings, which were of considerable scope and influence during 
the decade. Peffer was, in the late thirties, one of the most frequent and 
prominent contributors to periodicals on Far Eastern issues. As a jour-
nalist, Peffer had spent many years in the Orient, first going in 1915 as 
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a reporter to Shanghai and then to Peking where he was the New York 
Tribune correspondent. Years of residence in China qualified him to 
lecture at Columbia University in the early thirties. In 1936, he re-
turned to the Far East for two years. Throughout the thirties, and up 
to the outbreak of the war, he was a regular magazine contributor.48 
American policy in the Far East, in Peffer's view, had long been self-
serving. Since 1900, the United States had "unswervingly opposed the 
effort of any power to conquer, dominate, or control China or take a 
lien on its opportunities for development." Americans were determined 
that "China shall remain a free field for American economic enter-
prise." This policy, he wrote, was based on the assumption that the 
wealth and power of the nation depended upon the pursuit of an im-
perialist course in the undeveloped parts of the world.49 
Although United States trade and investment in China were rela-
tively small, and the net return from the Far East was negative, Peffer 
observed that some segments of the country profited from economic 
activity in Asia even though the average person did not. Those who did 
profit, and would be affected by cessation of Far Eastern trade and the 
loss of capital, represented important corporate interests. In view of the 
depression, even small losses, especially in trade, were undesirable. He 
concluded that "the Western Powers cannot permit Japan to take posses-
sion of the Far East without accepting the risk of national insolvency."50 
That Japan threatened to master East Asia was apparent to him. In 
1935, he pointed out the comparative growth of Japanese textile trade; 
exports to India had increased by 90% in two years; in 1933, Japan sold 
more cotton and rayon cloth to India than did Britain. Her exports to 
the Dutch East Indies were larger than the Netherlands'. Exports to 
Kenya and Uganda were six times Britain's. The increase in Japanese 
sales to Latin America was growing markedly.51 Japan, while the West 
was preoccupied with European affairs, was out to take advantage of her 
golden opportunity. "In plain words," Peffer wrote, "unless there is 
war, Japan will rule all Eastern Asia" and the United States and Europe 
will be excluded from the market of one quarter of the population of 
the earth. "America must forswear its future in the Far East or over-
come Japan. America must yield or Japan must yield. . . . Japan will 
not."52 
Thus Peffer concluded that the United States could either withdraw 
from the Far East and renounce America's economic future there or face 
war with Japan. He examined these alternatives throughout the decade. 
Considering withdrawal, Peffer questioned the value of the trade and 
investment that tied the nation to East Asia. He balanced the small 
yield from involvements in the Pacific against the cost of armaments 
there, and he noted that the United States did most of its trade (in the 
twenties, 75%) with non-colonial nations, i.e., with developed econ-
omies.53 In another context, he observed that imperialist "possession" 
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of an area did not necessarily guarantee trade, for example, in India, 
where Japanese trade flourished. Looking ahead, Peffer predicted that 
all imperialism in China would eventually fail as China developed. The 
gains of imperialism, Japanese or American, would diminish. "All em-
pire carries within itself the seeds of its destruction."54 
Peffer expressed a preference for withdrawal and a conviction that 
war was not a solution for international problems.55 However, he con-
cluded that the United States could not renounce its economic role in 
East Asia and give up its traditional China policy, despite the danger of 
war. The China policy was tied to the basic character of the country as 
an independent capitalist society seeking material progress and growth. 
Renouncing imperialism presupposed basic changes in the structure of 
society and in social philosophy. Not only would it bring a loss of power 
to established economic forces, but it would also necessitate reorganiza-
tion of the economy to permit independence from overseas markets. 
Only by socialization and redistribution of wealth, Peffer concluded, 
could the United States absorb what it could produce and eliminate war. 
Despite the demonstrable evils of imperialism, its inevitable self-defeat 
and the looming war, Peffer predicted that day-to-day profits would keep 
the country moving along the road it had chosen. War was inevitable.50 
Gradually Peffer came to accept the war, as did many other anti-
imperialists. By 1939, his writings supported a strong United States 
stand against Japan. In Harper's in March, 1939, noting once more the 
irrationality of the conflict with Japan, he advocated the use of force as 
a deterrent to Japanese advances in East Asia and as a way to avoid war. 
"One of the surest safeguards against any extended adventurings by the 
Japanese in the next few years is an American navy capable of striking 
swiftly and decisively from its own waters. . . . [I]n the present state of 
international society the absence of force is far more likely to [precipi-
tate the necessity of its use], and to do so under conditions of desperate 
disadvantage to those who are without force." It had, in his view, be-
come necessary to arm to prevent Japan from doing the things that 
would force the United States to go to war against her.57 
Peffer also advocated economic pressures against Japan to prevent 
her conquest of China. He urged the use of economic penalties, an 
embargo if necessary, and argued against renewal of the Japanese com-
mercial treaty. Thus, Peffer had come around to the policies of the 
Roosevelt administration, hoping they might postpone the conflict with 
Japan until war in Europe was over, and the United States, Britain and 
France could set terms for the Far East.58 
Eventually, Peffer asserted, the "Prerequisites to Peace in the Far 
East" entailed voluntary abandonment of the territorial, political and 
economic positions of the West in China. Japan must be taught a les-
son, but must also be able to live in the post-war world. The West must 
recognize her natural market in China and offer Japan solutions to her 
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real economic problems. Looking to the future in the Pacific, Peffer 
believed that peace was possible only if imperialism ended. China must 
be independent; self-government and independence must come to South-
east Asia too. The West must uproot the imperialism of the past if 
there were to be no more Pacific wars.59 
The development of Peffer's ideas offers a clear example of the course 
of liberal thinking that moved from advocacy of withdrawal in East Asia 
to support of Roosevelt's policy and eventually to support of war with 
Japan. The path Peffer took was trod by other anti-imperialists who 
eventually supported war preparedness and the war itself. The Neio 
Republic in its editorial views offers a similar example, consistently 
advocating withdrawal until the fall of 1939 when it supported aid to 
the Allies and changed its posture. 
In the thirties, the arguments of anti-imperialism, like those of 
pacifism and the various persuasions of isolationism, were part of an 
extensive public debate over the role and direction of the nation in 
international affairs. Like the other points of view, anti-imperialism was 
overwhelmingly rejected by the Roosevelt administration and by the 
American public which chose to accept the view that conflict with Japan 
was part of a larger conflict that threatened the well-being of the Atlantic 
community and therefore of the United States. By 1940, Roosevelt's 
policies of aid to the Allies were victorious. 
This triumph was a profound event in American history, and the 
forces that led to Roosevelt's success and the defeat of isolationism and 
other alternatives have been studied and interpreted extensively. They 
are, of course, beyond the scope of this paper. But there appear to be 
factors in American anti-imperialism itself that contributed to its failure 
to influence public opinion and the direction of policy in the thirties, 
and these factors are of special interest to us. 
Most important, the anti-imperialism of the thirties was not a move-
ment but a set of ideas and attitudes. Though lack of organization and 
cohesion seriously weakened the cause, they cannot explain the fail-
ure of the ideas to spread. The failure lies in the ideas themselves, 
for American anti-imperialism in the thirties was not willing or able to 
come to grips with the logic of its own position. The realization that 
American foreign policy was intricately and inextricably tied to the basic 
institutions of the country was one of the important ideas of anti-
imperialism, but it was also one of its greatest problems. For the anti-
imperialism of the thirties, like earlier movements in the United States, 
was neither Marxist nor revolutionary in inspiration, composition or 
ideology.60 It was a spontaneous native effort that generally did not 
spring from or rest upon any single notion as sturdy as the Marxist's 
view of society. American anti-imperialism in the thirties was unde-
veloped, eclectic and undoctrinaire. Its well-springs often were a com-
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bination of a sense of justice and a practical concern for the future. 
Although most of the anti-imperialist spokesmen saw the major causes 
of the coming confrontation with Japan in the country's economic and 
political institutions, by and large, they were not prepared to work 
actively for radical change in these institutions. Those who were did so 
without much hope of accomplishment. The failure of American social-
ism at the polls and the growing disenchantment of the left with the 
Soviet experiment gave a rather half-hearted character to left-wing move-
ments for radical change. The impossibility of changing the direction 
of U.S. foreign policy by first changing the society that generated such 
policies was clear. In effect, the anti-imperialists were advocating a 
foreign policy that could not be; their position, and most knew it, was 
wistful and chimerical. 
Withdrawal from East Asia not only required radical change in 
American institutions and leaders, but also ran counter to the attach-
ment of the public to the traditional American policy. The public had, 
after all, rarely opposed the "open door" in China or the growing hos-
tility between the United States and Japan. Even if the basic premise of 
anti-imperialism was correct and the Roosevelt government had as its 
main goal the advancement and protection of U.S. economic interests in 
the Pacific, by the 1930's the American involvement in Asia meant some-
thing different from this to the public. Any effort to alter American 
policy would have had to cope not only with the policy makers but also 
with the policy approvers, the American public. One need only note the 
lack of opposition to war with Japan, once it came about, and contrast 
this to the opposition to the war in Viet Nam in the sixties and seventies, 
to realize that World War II was a "popular" war. In practice, the 
American commitment in the Pacific amounted to more than a commit-
ment to protect trade and investments, and the anti-imperialist argu-
ments did not begin to deal with the sentimental and psychological 
aspects of the commitment to the Far East. 
Economic determinists, for example, might well have documented the 
vast financial investment of American churches in China, listing hold-
ings in real estate, hospital and school buildings, and revealing what the 
churches had to lose from Japanese domination of China. But such an 
exposé of economic interests would not have wiped out the sentimental 
attachment to the American Christian mission that years of church ser-
monizing and mission reporting had built up. Similarly, although ad-
ministration critics could document the absence of any binding commit-
ment by the United States to defend China against Japanese military 
advances, this in itself did not counteract the feeling of obligation and 
responsibility to China that had been nurtured in the American public 
by leaders such as Wilson and Roosevelt. The belief in an American 
mission in China, coupled with a natural sympathy for the underdog, 
the blatant brutality of Japan's imperialism and the association of Japan 
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with Nazi Germany meant that a host of factors other than economic 
ones played a role in determining policy in the thirties. 
Ever since Theodore Roosevelt had proclaimed the value to the 
United States of a balance of power in the Pacific, of preventing either 
Russian or Japanese domination in East Asia, such a balance had be-
come identified with national security. The relationship between the 
balance of power in Asia and American security was more often referred 
to than analyzed. Japan clearly did not threaten the continental United 
States. Even in the early twenties, when anti-Japanese fear was wide-
spread in the country and particularly in naval circles, the predicted war 
with Japan was expected to take place in the Far East.61 However, even 
if the anti-imperialists were correct and "national security in the Pacific" 
really was synonymous with freedom for American enterprise in Asia, 
by the thirties, Japanese domination of China was widely seen as a 
threat to American security in the Pacific. 
Here again, the anti-imperialist viewpoint did not come to grips with 
the emotions and beliefs of the public; its rational approach and its col-
lection of data could not counteract long-held attitudes and beliefs. 
Moreover, anti-imperialism, whatever its validity, placed the onus of 
responsibility for the threatening war on American policies as well as 
Japanese, and at times even excused Japanese aggression in light of the 
trespasses and injustices of the western powers in the past. Such self-
criticism soon was read as lack of patriotism. 
Characteristics of anti-imperialism in the thirties were a rational 
style, undoctrinaire and eclectic; the avoidance of radicalism and its 
larger implications; a tendency to focus on the practical problems at 
hand; diverse and often incompatible supporters; pragmatism, flexibility 
and eventual compromise. Anti-imperialism had, in short, many char-
acteristics of the liberal tradition and earlier reform traditions in the 
country. Like them, it had more to do with conscience than with 
guidance. 
Anti-imperialism in the 1930's was a continuation of a long and 
generally ineffective tradition of opposition to the transition of the 
United States from a dependent colonial state to a dominant world 
power. Efforts to acquire Cuba, tied closely to sectional controversy over 
slavery, roused anti-expansionist sentiment. The purchase of Alaska 
occasioned intense debate. Criticism of administration policy in Santo 
Domingo after the Civil War was the beginning of consistent opposition 
to expansion of American interests in both the Pacific and South Amer-
ica, which climaxed in the anti-imperialist movement of 1898-1900. Rob-
ert Beisner's study of this movement offers interesting similarities and 
contrasts with the thirties. As Beisner notes, that movement was fairly 
well organized, contained prominent and prestigious figures, received 
considerable public attention and was basically a conservative move-
ment, essentially isolationist and opposed to large changes in American 
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life. The anti-imperialism of 1898-1900 was often racist in its arguments 
against involvement of the United States with non-Anglo Saxon peoples. 
Like the anti-imperialism of the thirties, Beisner's movement was diverse 
in membership and viewpoints; its arguments were both moralistic and 
practical although Beisner contends that the opponents of expansionism 
had not clearly thought out the consequences of their position. Despite 
its prominence, the movement failed.62 Anti-imperialism in 1898-1900 
predated a costly war in the Philippines and decades of American im-
perialism in Central and South America. Similarly, the anti-imperialism 
of the thirties was followed by the very war it opposed, by the emergence 
of the United States as one of the dominant world powers in the Pacific 
and by two subsequent wars in East Asia. 
At no time in American history has anti-imperialism been as vocal 
or as organized as in the decade of the 1960's. Although the opposition 
to the war in Indochina and calls for withdrawal from the Far East have 
some similarities to isolationist ideas, the movement of the sixties and 
seventies appears to fall squarely in the tradition of anti-imperialism and 
in many ways echoes the movement of the thirties. Against the back-
ground of this study, the contemporary movement seems to be a con-
tinuation and development of a lengthy tradition, a tradition that has 
been weak but persistent in our past, and a tradition whose full effects 
and importance are still to be evaluated. 
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